The sense of time is foundational for perception and action, yet it frequently departs significantly from physical time. In the paper we review recent progress on temporal contextual effects, multisensory temporal integration, temporal recalibration, and related computational models. We suggest that subjective time arises from minimizing prediction errors and adaptive recalibration, which can be unified in the framework of predictive coding, a framework rooted in Helmholtz's 'perception as inference'.
Introduction
The sense of time, unlike other senses, is not generated by a specific sensory organ. Rather, all events that stimulate the brain, regardless of sensory modality, contain temporal cues. Because of heterogeneous processing of sensory events, subjective time may differ significantly for a given duration across modalities. For example, an auditory event is often perceived longer than a visual event of the same physical interval [1] . Subjective time is also susceptible to temporal context, voluntary actions, attention, arousal and emotional states, all of which can bias it away from physical time [2,3,4 ,5,6] . Over the past several decades, researchers have advanced our understanding of how we perceive and integrate multisensory and sensorimotor timing, with examples such as the 'central-tendency' effect [7 ,8 ,9] , the time shrinking illusion [10] , and sensorimotor temporal recalibration [11, 12 ] . In this article we examine a few selected duration-related temporal phenomena and related computational models, and show how those phenomena can be parsimoniously explained within the predictive coding framework [13, 14, 16 ]. We propose that subjective time is an outcome of adaptive processes of the brain that minimize the overall estimation error to boost the reliability of estimation of external temporal structures.
Subjective time as inference
One and a half centuries ago Hermann von Helmholtz famously suggested that perception can be understood as a process of unconscious inference: ''The connection between the sensation and external object can never be expressed without anticipating it already in the designation of the sensation. . . This is because inductive reasoning is the result of an unconscious and involuntary activity of memory '' [17] . Time perception is also the result of unconscious inference. Subjective time can be easily influenced by internal expectation, as suggested by Karl Vierordt [18] around the same time as von Helmholtz. He observed that subjective judgment of duration is attracted to an 'indifference point', which is close to the central mean of all the durations experienced [9, 18] . That is, short durations tend to be overestimated and long durations underestimated. Hollingworth later coined this phenomenon of gravitation toward the expected mean magnitude as the 'central tendency' effect [19] .
The recent surge of interest in the central tendency effect [7 ,8 ,20 ,21,22] has taken this topic to a new level within Bayesian inference framework. This development has been motivated by the fact that, across a wide variety of tasks, the fundamental problem encountered by the brain is coping with uncertainty [15] . To minimize uncertainty, the brain needs to maximally utilize the available information, combining not only sensory input but also top-down 'prior belief' in a weighted average manner. In Bayesian terms, perception emerges from probabilistic inference, including the likelihood associated with the sensory evidence and prior belief (see Box 1). While this type of weighted average is clearly beneficial when the external environment is relatively stable, combining multiple sources of information in the brain would engender perceptual and cognitive biases when the environment changes. Jazayeri and Shadlen [7 ] recently reinvestigated the central tendency effect in duration reproduction using a Bayesian approach, and confirmed that the fundamental principle of central tendency is a strategy to minimize the overall temporal reproduction errors by combining both sensory likelihood and prior knowledge (e.g., the statistical distribution) of the to-be-estimated duration. Their approach is illustrated in Figure 1 . When asked to reproduce temporal intervals, people tend to underestimate long intervals and overestimate short intervals, always 'regressing toward the mean'. Importantly, the mean is set dynamically, for the specific range being tested in that www.sciencedirect.com
